S3 and Inbound TLS: HTTPS-by-Default Enforcement
The S3 gateway turned HTTPS-or-explicit-insecure into the default: no silent plaintext for the gateway or inbound tcp/quic.
The S3 gateway turned HTTPS-or-explicit-insecure into the default: no silent plaintext for the gateway or inbound tcp/quic.
Query-string SigV4 for presigned URLs, mandatory X-Amz-Date freshness, and decoupling gateway access/secret keys from the native auth token.
The S3 gateway: SigV4, S3-compliant XML errors, Head/List/Copy, pagination, ranges, and metadata β a compatible API surface for real clients.
Envelope encryption with a client-held key: the server stores ciphertext and canβt read it β across S3 and native transports.
SigV4 signed payload verification for S3 PUT/POST and Server-Sent Events for async operation notifications.
aws-chunked payload encoding streams large S3 uploads in signed chunks β no full-body buffering, per-chunk SigV4 integrity.
Momoβs transport layer grew from TCP to a QUIC/TLS 1.3 fan-out β fixing handshake, ACK framing, deadlines, and TLS identity along the way.
A 76-deep audit (authed via Sentinel) surfaced CRLF injection, smuggling, traversal and path leaks β the pattern that forged momoβs security mindset.
The [storage] backend seam swaps blob storage (local, nfs, s3, raw) behind one Store interface, keeping CAS metadata local.
External S3 clients like aws-cli donβt send momo headers β the server detects this and downgrades client-side replication modes to server-side alternatives, ensuring replication never silently drops.